

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 CU-02

OES-03 COME-00 EB-07 XMB-02 TRSE-00 /072 R

66620

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APPROVED BY:C:HSOHNENFELDT

EUR:JAARMITAGE

ASD/ISA:COMMANDER STEEL

USIA/IEE:RCOONROD (SUBS)

CU/EE:VSCHAEFER (SUBS)

INR/RES/EE:PCOSTOLANSKI (SUBS)

OES/APT/SEP:WDECLERCQ (SUBS)

COMMERCE:SBILINSKI

EXIMBANK:RALBRIGHT (SUBS)

C/:WTSHINN

S/S

TREASURY:ERENDALL (SUBS)

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R 190336Z JUL 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

INFO AMCONSUL ZAGREB

S E C R E T STATE 170802

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - REENTRY DUE OMISSION CLEARANCE
OFFICES

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, YO, US J

SUBJECT: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR YUGOSLAVIA

REF: BELGRADE 1422

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1. EMBASSY BELGRADE'S ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR YUGO-
SLAVIA WAS REVIEWED BY AN INTERAGENCY GROUP JULY 3. THE
CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT WAS COMPRE-
HENSIVE AND GENERALLY SOUND. COMMENTS ON GENERAL US POLICY

OBJECTIVES, US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS, REPORTING PRIORITIES
AND PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION IN THE COMING MONTHS FOLLOW.

2. US POLICY OBJECTIVES AND OVERALL RELATIONS:

A. THE REVIEW GROUP AGREED THAT OUR GEO-STRATEGIC INTEREST IN YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE, UNITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY REMAINS UNCHANGED. YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED POSITION IN EUROPE ARE IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR STABILITY AND PEACE IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. IF THE USSR WERE TO ESTABLISH HEGEMONY OVER YUGOSLAVIA, THIS WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS ACCESS TO THE ADRIATIC, BRING SOVIET POWER UP TO THE ITALIAN BORDER, PUT PRESSURE ON GREECE AND ALBANIA, AND OUTFLANK ROMANIA. MOREOVER, INTERNAL UNCERTAINTIES IN GREECE AND

PORTUGAL AND GREEK-TURKISH TENSIONS OVER CYPRUS WERE SEEN AS HEIGHTENING THE IMPORTANCE TO THE US OF YUGOSLAVIA'S CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE.

B. THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT US POLICY SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT STRENGTHENING YUGOSLAVIA'S WILL AND ABILITY TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT AND MAXIMIZING US LEVERAGE IN POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA. SEVERAL MEMBERS FELT STRONGLY THAT STATEMENTS SUCH AS "US POLICY SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO STRENGTHENING YUGOSLAVIA TODAY..." WERE TOO SWEEPING AND SHOULD BE ESCHEWED IN FAVOR OF MORE PRECISE FORMULATIONS. (IT IS NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, US POLICY TO STRENGTHEN YUGOSLAVIA'S ROLE AS A LEADER AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, EVEN THOUGH THE YUGOSLAVS SEEM TO BE AMONG THE MODERATES IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.)

C. THE ASSESSMENT'S OBLIQUE REFERENCE (SENTENCE 1, PARAGRAPH 9) TO STRAINS IN US-YUGOSLAV POLITICAL RELATIONS RESULTING FROM SHARP YUGOSLAV CRITICISM OF US POLICIES ON SUCH ISSUES AS CHILE, VIET-NAM, THE PANAMA CANAL, PUERTO RICO AND KOREAN UNIFICATION WERE CONSIDERED SOMEWHAT
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FLIPPANT. WE EXPECT YUGOSLAV LEADERS TO BE COGNIZANT OF OUR INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND TO REALIZE THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS CANNOT BE INSULATED FROM THEIR STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS ON WORLD ISSUES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO LET THE YUGOSLAVS KNOW THAT GRATUITOUS CRITICISMS OF US POSITIONS ON ISSUES WHERE OUR VITAL INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE AND THEIR INTERESTS APPEAR MARGINAL AT BEST (E.G. PUERTO RICO, PANAMA CANAL, KOREA) WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE QUALITY OF OUR RELATIONS. THEY SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT SUCH CRITICISMS AFFECT THE ATTITUDES OF OUR LEADERS TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA.

D. THE GROUP ALSO FELT THAT THE EMBASSY'S STATEMENT THAT "WHILE TITO REMAINS OUR BILATERALS WILL BE ON A GEN-

ERALLY EVEN KEEL WITH BASIC US POLICY OBJECTIVES FULFILLED" REQUIRED SOME MODIFICATION. WHILE THE GROUP AGREED THAT TITO'S COMMITMENT TO THE PRESERVATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE, UNITY AND VIABILITY WORKS TO FULFILL BASIC US INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA, IT WAS NOTED THAT TITO'S OCCASIONAL HIP-SHOOTING TENDENCIES (VIZ. HIS STATEMENTS ON THE CIA AND CYPRUS AND ALLENDE'S DEMISE) HAVE SOMETIMES PRODUCED FAIRLY SHARP JOLTS IN US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS. SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TITO'S SUCCESSORS MIGHT WELL BE MORE SUSPICIOUS OF THE SOVIETS AND MORE WESTWARD LOOKING THAN TITO, "THE OLD REVOLUTIONARY", IS.

E. THE GROUP FELT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE EMBASSY TO USE THE ADJECTIVE "SOCIALIST" TO MODIFY

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YUGOSLAVIA IN THE PHRASE "...AND MAINTAIN A SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA DEMONSTRABLY FREE OF SOVIET HEGEMONY." THE GROUP REALIZED THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO A "SOCIALIST" YUGOSLAVIA. MOREOVER, OUR RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA ARE BASED SINCERELY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY IRRESPECTIVE OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION, HOWEVER, BETWEEN OUR INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A "YUGOSLAVIA DEMONSTRABLY FREE OF SOVIET HEGEMONY" AND MAINTAINING A "SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA" FREE OF THE SAME.

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3. US ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA:

ALTHOUGH THE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT DOES NOT DISCUSS US ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA, WE CONCUR WITH THE COUNTRY COMMERCIAL PROGRAM STATEMENT THAT A VIABLE AND EXPANDING ECONOMY IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING YUGOSLAVIA'S POSTURE OF INDEPENDENT NON-ALIGNMENT. US COOPERATION IN YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES ARE MEANS OF SUPPORTING A HEALTHY YUGOSLAV ECONOMY. EXPANDING RELATIONS HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL TO OUR BUSINESS INTERESTS AS WELL AS TO OUR GENERAL POLITICAL INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA. IN THE SHORT TERM, YUGOSLAV PROBLEMS IN BOTH THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AREAS HAVE LED THEM TO CONCLUDE THAT A RATHER VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF EXPORT EXPANSION AND TEMPORARY IMPORT LIMITATIONS IS NECESSARY. THIS WILL REQUIRE CONTINUING SUBSTANTIAL TRADE PROMOTION EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A GROWING MARKET FOR US EXPORTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND CONTINUED FREE ACCESS OF YUGOSLAV EXPORTS TO THE US.

4. THE GROUP GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE EMBASSY'S CAPSULE ANALYSIS OF THE YUGOSLAV INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SCENE. (IN ONE OR TWO INSTANCES, MEMBERS OF THE GROUP

FOUND THE ANALYSIS SOMEWHAT SIMPLISTIC, E.G. SENTENCE TWO OF PARAGRAPH 3.) IN REVIEWING THIS ANALYSIS, THE FOLLOWING INTERESTING ISSUES AND QUESTIONS, WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS A GUIDE FOR FUTURE EMBASSY REPORTS WERE RAISED:

A. CAN THE EMBASSY IDENTIFY THE "COMERS" AMONG YOUNGER PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS? WHAT ARE THE POSSIBILITIES OF BRINGING SOME OF THEM TO THE US UNDER THE IV PROGRAM?

B. HOW INFLUENTIAL AND ABLE DO THE EMBASSY AND CONGEN ADJUDGE SUCH LEADERS AS GRICKOV AND BILIC TO BE? ARE THERE ANY OBSERVABLE NUANCES OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR VIEWS AND THOSE OF KARDELJ, DOLANC, BAKARIC ET AL?

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C. IS THE ARMY'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE INCREASING AND, IF SO, IS THIS INFLUENCE HAVING AN IMPACT ON CERTAIN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES SUCH AS NPT?

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EIGN POLICY ISSUES SUCH AS NPT?

D. YUGOSLAVIA'S LESS-DEVELOPED REGIONS MAY CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE KEYS TO POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE POST-TITO ERA. ASSESSMENTS OF THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, PARTICULARLY KOSOVO, WOULD BE USEFUL. REPORTS MIGHT FOCUS INTER ALIA ON NATIONALITY RELATIONS, BREAD-AND-BUTTER ECONOMIC ISSUES, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FEDERAL LEADERSHIP, AND THE LEVEL OF SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE. (THE DIFFICULTY IN ACQUIRING INFORMATION UPON WHICH TO BASE SUCH ASSESSMENTS IS APPRECIATED.)

E. SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS APPLAUDED THE CONGEN'S COVERAGE OF CROATIAN AND SLOVENIAN AFFAIRS. A CONGEN OVERVIEW OF THE LEADERSHIP SITUATION IN THESE TWO REPUBLICS WOULD BE WELCOME.

F. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, INTEREST WAS EXPRESSED IN MORE REPORTING ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STABILIZATION EFFORTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE EYES OF REPUBLIC-LEVEL OFFICIALS, BANKERS AND ENTERPRISE MANAGERS.

G. THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN CURRENT TRENDS IN YUGOSLAV-SOVIET TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. SOME PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED THAT RECENT EVIDENCE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS MAY WISH TO SEE TRADE WITH YUGOSLAVIA LEVEL OFF AT APPROXIMATELY THE PRESENT VOLUME. OTHERS FELT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PUSHING FOR MORE ECONOMIC COOPERATION THAN THE YUGOSLAVS WANT.

5. BILATERAL ISSUES/COURSES OF ACTION:

A. MILITARY RELATIONS - THE GROUP CONCURRED WITH THE EMBASSY'S ASSERTION THAT THE USG SHOULD PROMOTE CLOSER CONTACTS WITH THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY BY MEANS OF EXCHANGES OF VISITS BY MILITARY AND OTHER DEFENSE PERSONNEL, TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND A WILLINGNESS TO SELL SELECTED MILITARY ITEMS IN WHICH THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST AND WHICH WE ARE IN A POSITION TO SELL. UNITS OF THE 6TH FLEET CONTINUE TO CALL REGULARLY AT YUGOSLAV SECRET

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PORTS AND JNA OFFICERS WILL AGAIN STUDY AT FT. LEAVENWORTH IN 1975-76. OFFICERS OF THE YUGOSLAV NAVY AND AIR FORCE ARE EXPECTED TO STUDY AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AND THE AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE RESPECTIVELY IN 1976-77. TRAINING IS ONE AREA IN WHICH MILITARY RELATIONS SHOULD BE EXPANDED STILL FURTHER.

CLOSER MILITARY COOPERATION WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED EASILY, HOWEVER. SUCH COOPERATION IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AS THE FREEZE ON MILITARY RELATIONS AS A RESULT OF YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR INDICATES. THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN BOTH THE US AND YUGOSLAV MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS WARY OF ESTABLISHING CLOSER MILITARY RELATIONS. FEAR OF POSSIBLE TRANSFER TO THE EAST OF US MILITARY ITEMS SOLD TO YUGOSLAVIA AND APPREHENSION THAT SOME OF THESE ITEMS MIGHT ONE DAY BE USED AGAINST US OR ALLIED FORCES LEAD SOME ELEMENTS IN THE USG TO BE RELUCTANT TO MAKE EXCEPTIONS TO THE NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY TO PERMIT THE SALE OF SELECTED CLASSIFIED ITEMS IN WHICH THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST. MOREOVER, THE RUSH-CLEMENTS JOINT POLICY STATEMENT OF JUNE 1973 RULES OUT CO-PRODUCTION FOR JOINT SALES OF MILITARY ITEMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES.

B. HIGH-LEVEL VISITS - THE GROUP AGREED THAT WE SHOULD FOLLOW THROUGH ON INVITATIONS TO YUGOSLAVS WHO ARE LIKELY TO BE KEY FIGURES IN THE POST-TITO GOVERNMENT. ONCE PRESIDENT FORD VISITS YUGOSLAVIA, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A SCHEDULE FOR VISITS BY KARDELJ ET AL.

C. ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

WE SHOULD:

- CONTINUE A STRONG TRADE PROMOTION EFFORT INCLUDING SUPPORT OF TRADE FAIR PARTICIPATION, TRADE MISSIONS AND SPECIALIZED TRADE MISSION-TECHNICAL SALES SEMINARS.

- MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE EXIMBANK INVOLVEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH MODERATE GROWTH IN EXIMBANK LENDING AND GUARANTEES FOR SUITABLE PROJECTS;

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- MAINTAIN OPIC SUPPORT FOR UE BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF FINANCING AND PARTICIPATION IN JOINT VENTURES IN THIRD COUNTRIES;

- CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A REASONABLE LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA BY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS INCLUDING IBRD AND IMF;

- ENCOURAGE YUGOSLAVIA'S PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS IN THE EEC TO MAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE YUGOSLAV TRADE AND FINANCING NEEDS WHEN FORMULATING ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA;

- CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE GOY TO AMEND THE JOINT VENTURE LAW TO PERMIT MORE FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENTS
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INCLUDING REPATRIATION OF PROFITS.

- ENCOURAGE, BY MEANS OF ADVANCE CONSULTATION AND APPEALS TO YUGOSLAVIA'S INTEREST IN CONTINUING CLOSE ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, MODERATE YUGOSLAVIA BEHAVIOR IN GROUP OF 77 CONSIDERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES.

D. EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES:

THE GROUP AGREED THAT THE EXPANSION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES SECTOR OF ACADEMIC EXCHANGES IS, IN PRINCIPLE, DESIRABLE.

WHILE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON YUGOSLAVS STUDYING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES HERE WAS DEEMED FEASIBLE, SEVERAL MEMBERS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SIMILAR EXPANSION IN THE OTHER DIRECTION GIVEN: (1) THE GOY'S POOR RECORD IN PLACING PRESENT US SCHOLARS WORKING IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES; AND (2) GOY RESTRICTIONS ON THE TYPES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE METHODS WHICH CAN BE EMPLOYED IN YUGOSLAVIA. THE EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THERE BE MORE CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS SHOULD BE MADE MORE SPECIFIC. THE US SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN WELL REPRESENTED AT THE VARIOUS YUGOSLAV FESTIVALS. WHAT SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL TYPES OF GROUPS ARE NEEDED AND WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE ADDITIONAL FUNDING REQUIRED? THE GROUP ENDORSED THE EMBASSY'S EMPHASIS ON THE IV PROGRAM, PAR-
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TICULARLY FOR YOUNGER POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL LEADERS.

E. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

THE IMPORTANCE AND ACCOMPLISHMENT TO DATE OF US-YUGOSLAV

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION IS RECOGNIZED AS A VERY SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONS; EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MAINTAIN THESE S&T RELATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE EMBASSY KNOWS, NEARLY ALL THE REMAINING PL-480 DINARS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT JOINT RESEARCH HAVE BEEN OBLIGATED AND THE CHANCES OF OBTAINING SUBSTANTIAL SOURCES OF DOLLAR FUNDING ARE MEAGER. THE GROUP CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD: (1) CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE APPROPRIATE US AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE COOPERATIVE PROJECTS IN YUGOSLAVIA; AND (2) MOTIVATE AND ASSIST YUGOSLAV SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS TO SEEK ACTIVELY ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF US FUNDING TO SUPPORT JOINT RESEARCH PROJECTS. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE YUGOSLAVS THAT, EVEN IF THESE EXFORTS SUCCEED, SUCH NEW FUNDING WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A SMALL FRACTION OF CURRENT US SPENDING.

F. EXHIBITS AND OTHER MULTI-AGENCY EFFORTS

SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP CALLED FOR MORE INTENSIVE AND CAREFUL COORDINATION AND PREPARATION IN WASHINGTON AND IN THE EMBASSY OF EXHIBITS (E.G. THE NOVI SAD FAIR) AND OTHER PROGRAMS WHICH ACHIEVE MULTIPLE AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING US OBJECTIVES. KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, INTERAGENCY COMMITTEES, PARA
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE170802
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750250-0661
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197507106/baaaapts.tel
Line Count: 351
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 JUL 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <12 NOV 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> mcm 971014
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, US, YO, PFOR
To: BELGRADE INFO ZAGREB
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006